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Definition 4.1 We say that expected utility (EU) holds if there exists a
measurable and strictly increasing function         R on the space of conse-
quences, referred to as the utility function, and a probability measure P on  ,
such that the preference order ⪰ on   is represented by a functional   of the
form     
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          P        . Thus, the decision alternative       is
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                                            P                               
                                                                         
                                                                         
                                                     
Definition 4.2 We say that a risk ϵ       R is heavy-tailed to the left
(right) under P if its moment-generating function is in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Proposition 4.2 Assume that EU holds and that the budget feasibility re-
striction (5) applies.
(a) If        and ϵ1 is heavy-tailed to the left under P, then         ;
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Proposition 6.1 With power utility, expected welfare exists under normal-
ity but not under a Student distribution.
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7 Learning, agreement and robustness
7.1 Learning and agreement
                                                                     
                                                                          
                                                                        
                                                                     ﬃ    
                                                                             
                            
                                                                 
                                                                          
  ﬀ                          ﬀ                                           
                                                                           
                                                                       


















                                     
                                                                            
                                                                         
                                                                          
                                                                       
                                                                         
                                                                             
                                                                            
                                                                           
                                                                         
                                                                            
                                                                         
                                                                             
                                                                           
                                                                             
                                                                          
                                                                              
                                                                               
                                                                       
                                0  0  0                                      
                                                                              
                  
0   
0   
0  
7.1.1 Inputs
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Agreement Robustness
a b c d e f g
Parameter values
 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5
df 10 25 10 10 25 10 10
k 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.0
Policy instruments, beginning of period 0
0 0.0910 0.0910 0.0888 0.1192 0.0887 0.0861 0.1163
C0 424.33 424.31 413.71 438.01 413.50 400.67 427.56
I0 131.46 131.47 142.08 117.73 142.29 155.12 128.19
Capital stock and expectations
K1 179.23 179.25 189.86 165.50 190.06 202.89 175.96
1 0.1135 0.1135 0.1154 0.1604 0.1154 0.1175 0.1655
H2 1.0413 1.0413 1.0429 1.0309 1.0430 1.0449 1.0323
Probabilities of catastrophe ℓ
  5.0E 03 3.3E 03 5.2E 02 5.1E 03 5.3E 02 1.4E 01 5.2E 02
  2.3E 05 5.9E 07 1.4E 03 2.6E 05 5.5E 04 1.2E 02 1.5E 03
  2.5E 07 5.0E 11 2.8E 05 2.6E 07 8.2E 07 4.9E 04 3.0E 05
Values of statistical subsistence Vℓ = VSSℓ=C0
V  2.8E+01 2.9E+01 4.8E+00 2.4E+01 4.1E+00 2.9E+00 4.1E+00
V  1.3E+04 2.8E+05 3.1E+02 1.1E+04 5.3E+02 5.2E+01 2.6E+02
V  1.9E+06 4.2E+09 2.0E+04 1.6E+06 3.6E+05 1.4E+03 1.7E+04
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8 Concluding remarks
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